On Parameterized Complexity of Group Activity Selection Problems on Social Networks
Ayumi Igarashi, Robert Bredereck, Edith Elkind

TL;DR
This paper investigates the parameterized complexity of group activity selection problems on social networks, analyzing how the number of activities and players affect the computational difficulty of finding stable outcomes.
Contribution
It provides new fixed-parameter tractability algorithms and hardness results for various stability concepts in gGASP based on network structure and problem parameters.
Findings
FPT algorithm for Nash stability on acyclic social networks with few activities
W[1]-hardness results for clique networks for classic GASP
Polynomial-time solvability when the number of players is bounded
Abstract
In Group Activity Selection Problem (GASP), players form coalitions to participate in activities and have preferences over pairs of the form (activity, group size). Recently, Igarashi et al. have initiated the study of group activity selection problems on social networks (gGASP): a group of players can engage in the same activity if the members of the group form a connected subset of the underlying communication structure. Igarashi et al. have primarily focused on Nash stable outcomes, and showed that many associated algorithmic questions are computationally hard even for very simple networks. In this paper we study the parameterized complexity of gGASP with respect to the number of activities as well as with respect to the number of players, for several solution concepts such as Nash stability, individual stability and core stability. The first parameter we consider in the number of…
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Taxonomy
TopicsGame Theory and Voting Systems · Complexity and Algorithms in Graphs · Auction Theory and Applications
