Connecting the Dots: Privacy Leakage via Write-Access Patterns to the Main Memory
Tara Merin John, Syed Kamran Haider, Hamza Omar, Marten van Dijk

TL;DR
This paper demonstrates that write-access patterns to main memory can leak sensitive cryptographic information, showing a practical attack on a cryptographic algorithm using compromised DMA devices, highlighting a new side-channel vulnerability.
Contribution
It introduces a novel attack exploiting write-access patterns and DMA snapshots to recover cryptographic secrets, expanding understanding of memory-based side-channel vulnerabilities.
Findings
Successfully inferred a 512-bit secret exponent in 3.5 minutes
Demonstrated attack on power-resistant Montgomery's ladder algorithm
Discussed potential attack on McEliece cryptosystem
Abstract
Data-dependent access patterns of an application to an untrusted storage system are notorious for leaking sensitive information about the user's data. Previous research has shown how an adversary capable of monitoring both read and write requests issued to the memory can correlate them with the application to learn its sensitive data. However, information leakage through only the write access patterns is less obvious and not well studied in the current literature. In this work, we demonstrate an actual attack on power-side-channel resistant Montgomery's ladder based modular exponentiation algorithm commonly used in public key cryptography. We infer the complete 512-bit secret exponent in minutes by virtue of just the write access patterns of the algorithm to the main memory. In order to learn the victim algorithm's write access patterns under realistic settings, we exploit a…
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Taxonomy
TopicsSecurity and Verification in Computing · Cryptographic Implementations and Security · Cryptography and Data Security
