A short introduction to secrecy and verifiability for elections
Elizabeth A. Quaglia, Ben Smyth

TL;DR
This paper discusses the importance of formal definitions of secrecy and verifiability in election schemes, illustrating their use through analysis and improvement of the Helios voting system.
Contribution
It introduces formal definitions of secrecy and verifiability for elections and demonstrates their application in analyzing and enhancing election schemes like Helios.
Findings
Identified vulnerabilities in the original Helios system
Developed a secure variant of Helios with formal proofs
Highlighted the importance of formal analysis in election security
Abstract
We explore the fundamental properties that are necessary to ensure that election schemes behave as expected. The exploration reveals how our understanding of those expectations has evolved, culminating in the emergence of formal definitions of properties necessary to fulfil expectations. We provide insights into definitions of secrecy and verifiability, allowing us to learn and appreciate the underlying intuition and technical details of these notions. Equipped with definitions, we can build election schemes that can be proven to behave as expected. And, as an illustrative example, we review a variant of the Helios election system that was built and proven secure, in this way. Furthermore, the definitions can be used to analyse existing election schemes, and vulnerabilities have been uncovered. Indeed, we describe a series of vulnerabilities that were discovered during the analysis of…
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Taxonomy
TopicsInternet Traffic Analysis and Secure E-voting · Security and Verification in Computing · Network Security and Intrusion Detection
