The Final Theory of Physics - a Tautology?

TL;DR

This paper critically examines the concept of a final theory of physics, arguing that such a theory would necessarily be a tautology derived from the inherent assumptions of physics, thus challenging its feasibility.

Contribution

It provides a logical analysis showing that a final theory of physics cannot include non-trivial propositions and would ultimately be a tautology based on the foundational assumptions of physics.

Findings

A final theory cannot incorporate fundamental constants as non-trivial entities.

A final theory can only be a tautology derived from the presuppositions of physics.

It is logically impossible for a final theory to support scientific realism.

Abstract

We acuminate the idea of a final theory of physics in order to analyze its logical implications and consequences. It is argued that the rationale of a final theory is the principle of sufficient reason. This implies that a final theory of physics, presumed such a theory is possible, does not allow to incorporate substantial (non-trivial) propositions unless they are logically or mathematically deduced. Differences between physics and mathematics are discussed with emphasis on the role of physical constants. It is shown that it is logically impossible to introduce constants on the fundamental level of a final theory. The most fundamental constants emerging within a final theory are constants of motion. It is argued that the only possibility to formulate a final theory is necessarily a tautology: A final theory of physics can only be derived from those presumptions about reality that are inherent in the idea and practice of physics itself. It is argued that a final theory is based on the notion of objectivity, but it is logically impossible that an ideal final theory supports realism.