Quantifying Equivocation for Finite Blocklength Wiretap Codes

TL;DR

This paper introduces Monte Carlo methods to quantify equivocation in finite blocklength wiretap codes, enabling comparison of code families and revealing security benefits at small to medium blocklengths.

Contribution

It develops a novel Monte Carlo approach for analyzing equivocation in finite blocklength wiretap codes, focusing on coset-based codes and their security performance.

Findings

Certain codes offer security advantages at small to medium blocklengths

Monte Carlo strategies effectively quantify equivocation in the small blocklength regime

Comparison of code families reveals optimal choices for security

Abstract

This paper presents a new technique for providing the analysis and comparison of wiretap codes in the small blocklength regime over the binary erasure wiretap channel. A major result is the development of Monte Carlo strategies for quantifying a code's equivocation, which mirrors techniques used to analyze normal error correcting codes. For this paper, we limit our analysis to coset-based wiretap codes, and make several comparisons of different code families at small and medium blocklengths. Our results indicate that there are security advantages to using specific codes when using small to medium blocklengths.