Insider-Attacks on Physical-Layer Group Secret-Key Generation in Wireless Networks

TL;DR

This paper reveals vulnerabilities in physical-layer group secret-key generation protocols to stealth insider attacks, proposing attack methods and discussing detection techniques, highlighting the need for enhanced security measures in wireless networks.

Contribution

It introduces novel insider attack strategies on GSK protocols and evaluates their effectiveness, exposing security gaps in existing schemes.

Findings

GSK protocols are vulnerable to insider stealth attacks.

Attack methods can cause key mismatches and reduce key rates.

Detection techniques can identify anomalies but have limitations.

Abstract

Physical-layer group secret-key (GSK) generation is an effective way of generating secret keys in wireless networks, wherein the nodes exploit inherent randomness in the wireless channels to generate group keys, which are subsequently applied to secure messages while broadcasting, relaying, and other network-level communications. While existing GSK protocols focus on securing the common source of randomness from external eavesdroppers, they assume that the legitimate nodes of the group are trusted. In this paper, we address insider attacks from the legitimate participants of the wireless network during the key generation process. Instead of addressing conspicuous attacks such as switching-off communication, injecting noise, or denying consensus on group keys, we introduce stealth attacks that can go undetected against state-of-the-art GSK schemes. We propose two forms of attacks, namely: (i) different-key attacks, wherein an insider attempts to generate different keys at different nodes, especially across nodes that are out of range so that they fail to recover group messages despite possessing the group key, and (ii) low-rate key attacks, wherein an insider alters the common source of randomness so as to reduce the key-rate. We also discuss various detection techniques, which are based on detecting anomalies and inconsistencies on the channel measurements at the legitimate nodes. Through simulations we show that GSK generation schemes are vulnerable to insider-threats, especially on topologies that cannot support additional secure links between neighbouring nodes to verify the attacks.