A Savage-Like Axiomatization for Nonstandard Expected Utility

TL;DR

This paper introduces a Savage-like axiomatization for nonstandard expected utility theory, relaxing Savage's sixth axiom to broaden the theoretical framework for decision-making under uncertainty.

Contribution

It presents a novel axiomatization of nonstandard expected utility theory, extending Savage's foundational work by weakening a key axiom.

Findings

A new axiomatization aligns with nonstandard expected utility models

The approach broadens the theoretical understanding of decision-making

It maintains consistency with Savage's original framework

Abstract

Since Leonard Savage's epoch-making "Foundations of Statistics", Subjective Expected Utility Theory has been the presumptive model for decision-making. Savage provided an act-based axiomatization of standard expected utility theory. In this article, we provide a Savage-like axiomatization of nonstandard expected utility theory. It corresponds to a weakening of Savage's 6th axiom.