Conceptual Spaces for Cognitive Architectures: A Lingua Franca for Different Levels of Representation

TL;DR

This paper explores how Conceptual Spaces can serve as a unifying framework to integrate various levels of representation in cognitive architectures, bridging symbolic, sub-symbolic, and diagrammatic approaches.

Contribution

It proposes using Conceptual Spaces as a lingua franca to unify and generalize different representational levels in cognitive architectures, addressing their limitations.

Findings

Conceptual Spaces can unify symbolic and sub-symbolic representations.

They offer a common ground for integrating diverse cognitive models.

The framework addresses limitations of existing approaches.

Abstract

During the last decades, many cognitive architectures (CAs) have been realized adopting different assumptions about the organization and the representation of their knowledge level. Some of them (e.g. SOAR [Laird (2012)]) adopt a classical symbolic approach, some (e.g. LEABRA [O'Reilly and Munakata (2000)]) are based on a purely connectionist model, while others (e.g. CLARION [Sun (2006)] adopt a hybrid approach combining connectionist and symbolic representational levels. Additionally, some attempts (e.g. biSOAR) trying to extend the representational capacities of CAs by integrating diagrammatical representations and reasoning are also available [Kurup and Chandrasekaran (2007)]. In this paper we propose a reflection on the role that Conceptual Spaces, a framework developed by Peter G\"ardenfors [G\"ardenfors (2000)] more than fifteen years ago, can play in the current development of the Knowledge Level in Cognitive Systems and Architectures. In particular, we claim that Conceptual Spaces offer a lingua franca that allows to unify and generalize many aspects of the symbolic, sub-symbolic and diagrammatic approaches (by overcoming some of their typical problems) and to integrate them on a common ground. In doing so we extend and detail some of the arguments explored by G\"ardenfors [G\"ardenfors (1997)] for defending the need of a conceptual, intermediate, representation level between the symbolic and the sub-symbolic one.