Sustainable Incentives for Mobile Crowdsensing: Auctions, Lotteries, and Trust and Reputation Systems
Tony T. Luo, Salil S. Kanhere, Jianwei Huang, Sajal K. Das, Fan Wu

TL;DR
This paper reviews various incentive mechanisms for mobile crowdsensing, emphasizing sustainability, including auctions, lotteries, and trust systems, and explores additional promising frameworks like bargaining and market-driven approaches.
Contribution
It provides a comprehensive exposition of six incentive mechanisms for mobile crowdsensing, highlighting design principles and sustainability considerations.
Findings
Analysis of six incentive mechanisms with focus on sustainability
Identification of three promising frameworks: bargaining, contract, market-driven
Guidelines for designing effective incentive systems in crowdsensing
Abstract
Proper incentive mechanisms are critical for mobile crowdsensing systems to motivate people to actively and persistently participate. This article provides an exposition of design principles of six incentive mechanisms, drawing special attention to the sustainability issue. We cover three primary classes of incentive mechanisms: auctions, lotteries, and trust and reputation systems, as well as three other frameworks of promising potential: bargaining games, contract theory, and market-driven mechanisms.
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Taxonomy
TopicsMobile Crowdsensing and Crowdsourcing · Auction Theory and Applications · Privacy-Preserving Technologies in Data
