The emergence of pseudo-stable states in network dynamics
L. Hedayatifar, F. Hassanibesheli, A.H. Shirazi, S. Vasheghani, Farahani, G.R. Jafari

TL;DR
This paper investigates network dynamics under Heider balance theory, revealing pseudo-deterministic paths leading systems to jammed and balanced states, with the Inverse Participation Ratio serving as an effective indicator of these collective behaviors.
Contribution
It introduces the use of the Inverse Participation Ratio to predict pseudo-deterministic paths in network evolution towards specific states.
Findings
Inverse Participation Ratio indicates collective behavior in network paths.
Paths to jammed states are not random but follow predictable patterns.
Proximity to final states constrains the system's evolution.
Abstract
In the context of network dynamics, the complexity of systems increases possible evolutionary paths that often are not deterministic. Occasionally, some map routs form over the course of time which guide systems towards some particular states. The main intention of this study is to discover an indicator that can help predict these pseudo-deterministic paths in advance. Here we investigate the dynamics of networks based on Heider balance theory that states the tendency of systems towards decreasing tension. This inclination leads systems to some local and global minimum tension states called "jammed states" and "balanced states", respectively. We show that not only paths towards jammed states are not completely random but also there exist secret pseudo deterministic paths that bound the system to end up in these special states. Our results display that the Inverse Participation Ratio…
Peer Reviews
No public reviews on file for this paper yet. If you reviewed it on a platform where reviews are public (OpenReview, ICLR, NeurIPS, ICML), you can paste yours below so the community can read it here.
Videos
No videos yet. Explain this paper in a talk, walkthrough, or lecture? Add one.
Taxonomy
TopicsComplex Network Analysis Techniques · Opinion Dynamics and Social Influence · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
