The formal-logical characterisation of lies, deception, and associated notions
Toni Heidenreich

TL;DR
This paper reviews formal logical definitions of lies and deception, assessing their correctness and completeness, and highlights the gaps for applying these concepts in intelligent agent environments.
Contribution
It provides a comprehensive evaluation of existing formal definitions of dishonesty, identifying which meet philosophical standards and outlining steps for practical application.
Findings
Few definitions fully meet the correctness and completeness criteria.
Most formal approaches lack practical applicability in agent environments.
The review highlights missing steps for real-world implementation.
Abstract
Defining various dishonest notions in a formal way is a key step to enable intelligent agents to act in untrustworthy environments. This review evaluates the literature for this topic by looking at formal definitions based on modal logic as well as other formal approaches. Criteria from philosophical groundwork is used to assess the definitions for correctness and completeness. The key contribution of this review is to show that only a few definitions fully comply with this gold standard and to point out the missing steps towards a successful application of these definitions in an actual agent environment.
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Taxonomy
TopicsLogic, Reasoning, and Knowledge · Multi-Agent Systems and Negotiation · Access Control and Trust
