Dynamic Spectrum Leasing with Two Sellers

TL;DR

This paper models and analyzes a dynamic spectrum leasing scenario with two primary networks acting as sellers, using game theory to find equilibrium leasing strategies across different epochs.

Contribution

It introduces a multi-epoch model for spectrum leasing with two sellers and derives closed-form Nash equilibria for the leasing game.

Findings

Nash equilibria are explicitly derived for the leasing game.

The model captures the impact of different leasing periods on strategies.

Solutions for each epoch are analytically obtained.

Abstract

This paper studies dynamic spectrum leasing in a cognitive radio network. There are two spectrum sellers, who are two primary networks, each with an amount of licensed spectrum bandwidth. When a seller has some unused spectrum, it would like to lease the unused spectrum to secondary users. A coordinator helps to perform the spectrum leasing stage-by-stage. As the two sellers may have different leasing period, there are three epochs, in which seller 1 has spectrum to lease in Epochs II and III, while seller 2 has spectrum to lease in Epochs I and II. Each seller needs to decide how much spectrum it should lease to secondary users in each stage of its leasing period, with a target at revenue maximization. It is shown that, when the two sellers both have spectrum to lease (i.e., in Epoch II), the spectrum leasing can be formulated as a non-cooperative game. Nash equilibria of the game are found in closed form. Solutions of the two users in the three epochs are derived.