A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for a Buyer with Complements
Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, and S. Matthew Weinberg

TL;DR
This paper introduces a simple, approximately optimal mechanism for revenue maximization in settings where a buyer's valuation exhibits both substitutes and complements, extending previous work to more complex valuation structures.
Contribution
It presents the first approximately optimal mechanism for buyers with valuations that include complements, using a duality framework and a novel hypergraph partitioning algorithm.
Findings
The mechanism guarantees a Θ(d) fraction of the optimal revenue.
It extends prior results from subadditive to valuations with complements.
Provides a new model and measure for the degree of complementarity.
Abstract
We consider a revenue-maximizing seller with heterogeneous items and a single buyer whose valuation for the items may exhibit both substitutes (i.e., for some , ) and complements (i.e., for some , ). We show that the mechanism first proposed by Babaioff et al. [2014] - the better of selling the items separately and bundling them together - guarantees a fraction of the optimal revenue, where is a measure on the degree of complementarity. Note that this is the first approximately optimal mechanism for a buyer whose valuation exhibits any kind of complementarity, and extends the work of Rubinstein and Weinberg [2015], which proved that the same simple mechanisms achieve a constant factor approximation when buyer valuations are subadditive, the most general class of complement-free valuations. Our…
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