Reverse Engineering of Irreducible Polynomials in GF(2^m) Arithmetic
Cunxi Yu, Daniel Holcomb, Maciej Ciesielski

TL;DR
This paper introduces a computer algebra technique to reverse engineer the irreducible polynomial used in GF(2^m) multipliers, enabling verification of such circuits without prior knowledge of P(x).
Contribution
The paper presents a novel algebraic method to extract the irreducible polynomial P(x) from GF(2^m) multipliers, applicable to various architectures and polynomials.
Findings
Successfully reverse engineered P(x) for different GF multipliers
Effective on Mastrovito and Montgomery multiplier architectures
Works with NIST-recommended and optimal polynomials
Abstract
Current techniques for formally verifying circuits implemented in Galois field (GF) arithmetic are limited to those with a known irreducible polynomial P(x). This paper presents a computer algebra based technique that extracts the irreducible polynomial P(x) used in the implementation of a multiplier in GF(2^m). The method is based on first extracting a unique polynomial in Galois field of each output bit independently. P(x) is then obtained by analyzing the algebraic expression in GF(2^m) of each output bit. We demonstrate that this method is able to reverse engineer the irreducible polynomial of an n-bit GF multiplier in n threads. Experiments were performed on Mastrovito and Montgomery multipliers with different P (x), including NIST-recommended polynomials and optimal polynomials for different microprocessor architectures.
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Taxonomy
TopicsLow-power high-performance VLSI design · Cryptography and Residue Arithmetic · Formal Methods in Verification
