Formation of coalition structures as a non-cooperative game 2: applications

TL;DR

This paper explores applications of a non-cooperative game model for coalition formation, demonstrating its use in cooperation, Bayesian, and stochastic games, and analyzing equilibrium stability and externalities.

Contribution

It introduces novel applications of a non-cooperative coalition formation game, including models with externalities, stochastic states, and stability analysis.

Findings

Demonstrates the model's applicability to cooperation and Bayesian games

Shows the existence of self-enforcing equilibrium properties

Develops a non-cooperative stability criterion

Abstract

The paper uses a non-cooperative simultaneous game for coalition structure formation (Levando, 2016) to demonstrate some applications of the introduced game: a cooperation, a Bayesian game within a coalition with intra-coalition externalities, a stochastic game, where states are coalition structures; self-enforcement properties of a non-cooperative equilibrium and a construction of a non-cooperative stability criterion.