Security of a single-state semi-quantum key distribution protocol
Wei Zhang, Daowen Qiu, Paulo Mateus

TL;DR
This paper proves the unconditional security of a single-state semi-quantum key distribution protocol, deriving a key rate lower bound and error threshold, and compares its robustness to other quantum protocols.
Contribution
It provides the first complete unconditional security proof for a single-state semi-quantum key distribution protocol, including a key rate bound and error threshold analysis.
Findings
Established a lower bound for the protocol's key rate.
Identified an error threshold for secure key generation.
Compared the protocol's security threshold with other quantum protocols.
Abstract
Semi-quantum key distribution protocols are allowed to set up a secure secret key between two users. Compared with their full quantum counterparts, one of the two users is restricted to perform some "classical" or "semi-quantum" operations, which makes them easily realizable by using less quantum resource. However, the semi-quantum key distribution protocols mainly rely on a two-way quantum channel. The eavesdropper has two opportunities to intercept the quantum states transmitted in the quantum communication stage. It may allow the eavesdropper to get more information and make the security analysis more complicated. In the past ten years, many semi-quantum key distribution protocols have been proposed and proved to be robust. But there are few works concerned about their unconditional security. It is doubted that how secure the semi-quantum ones are and how much noise can they tolerate…
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Taxonomy
TopicsQuantum Information and Cryptography · Quantum Mechanics and Applications · Quantum Computing Algorithms and Architecture
