Budget Feasible Mechanisms on Matroids
Stefano Leonardi, Gianpiero Monaco, Piotr Sankowski, Qiang, Zhang

TL;DR
This paper develops a polynomial-time, truthful, budget-feasible mechanism for procuring maximum-value independent sets from matroids, achieving a 4-approximation, and extends it to matroid intersections with a general approximation guarantee.
Contribution
It introduces the first deterministic, polynomial-time, truthful, budget-feasible mechanism for matroids with a 4-approximation and extends it to matroid intersections with a flexible approximation ratio.
Findings
Achieves a 4-approximation for single matroid procurement.
Extends to matroid intersections with a (3α+1)-approximation.
Provides a polynomial-time, truthful, budget-feasible mechanism.
Abstract
Motivated by many practical applications, in this paper we study {\em budget feasible mechanisms} where the goal is to procure independent sets from matroids. More specifically, we are given a matroid where each ground (indivisible) element is a selfish agent. The cost of each element (i.e., for selling the item or performing a service) is only known to the element itself. There is a buyer with a budget having additive valuations over the set of elements . The goal is to design an incentive compatible (truthful) budget feasible mechanism which procures an independent set of the matroid under the given budget that yields the largest value possible to the buyer. Our result is a deterministic, polynomial-time, individually rational, truthful and budget feasible mechanism with -approximation to the optimal independent set. Then, we extend our mechanism to…
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Taxonomy
TopicsAuction Theory and Applications · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Consumer Market Behavior and Pricing
