What Do We Elect Committees For? A Voting Committee Model for Multi-Winner Rules

TL;DR

This paper introduces a voting committee model where elected representatives make final decisions through ballots, analyzing how different multi-winner rules and decision systems impact voter satisfaction and representation.

Contribution

The paper proposes a novel voting committee model linking election rules and decision procedures, enhancing understanding of voter representation in multi-winner elections.

Findings

Different multi-winner rules suit different decision systems.

Voter satisfaction improves when election and decision rules adapt to preferences.

Flexible rules lead to better voter representation.

Abstract

We present a new model that describes the process of electing a group of representatives (e.g., a parliament) for a group of voters. In this model, called the voting committee model, the elected group of representatives runs a number of ballots to make final decisions regarding various issues. The satisfaction of voters comes from the final decisions made by the elected committee. Our results suggest that depending on a decision system used by the committee to make these final decisions, different multi-winner election rules are most suitable for electing the committee. Furthermore, we show that if we allow not only a committee, but also an election rule used to make final decisions, to depend on the voters' preferences, we can obtain an even better representation of the voters.