Phragm\'en's sequential method with a variance criterion
Xavier Mora

TL;DR
This paper explores a variant of Phragmén's sequential method for approval voting, which generalizes Sainte-Laguë's rule instead of using D'Hondt's rule, aiming to improve proportional representation.
Contribution
It introduces a new variant of Phragmén's method that replaces D'Hondt's rule with Sainte-Laguë's rule, expanding the method's theoretical framework.
Findings
The variant offers a different approach to proportional representation.
It provides a theoretical basis for the new method.
Potential implications for approval voting systems.
Abstract
A variant of Phragm\'en's method for proportional representation via approval voting is briefly explored. Instead of D'Hondt's rule, this variant generalizes Sainte-Lagu\"e's rule.
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Taxonomy
TopicsGame Theory and Voting Systems · Electoral Systems and Political Participation
