Countermeasure against blinding attacks on low-noise detectors with background noise cancellation scheme
Min Soo Lee, Byung Kwon Park, Min Ki Woo, Chang Hoon Park, Yong-Su, Kim, Sang-Wook Han, Sung Moon

TL;DR
This paper proposes a new countermeasure for low-noise detectors in quantum key distribution systems that effectively detects and prevents blinding attacks, enhancing security.
Contribution
A novel countermeasure against blinding attacks on low-noise detectors using background noise cancellation schemes is introduced and experimentally validated.
Findings
Successfully detects blinding attack attempts in QKD systems
Demonstrates the effectiveness of the proposed countermeasure in experimental setups
Enhances security of low-noise detectors against hacking
Abstract
We developed a countermeasure against blinding attacks on low-noise detectors with a background noise cancellation scheme in quantum key distribution (QKD) systems. Background noise cancellation includes self-differencing and balanced avalanche photon diode (APD) schemes and is considered a promising solution for low-noise APDs, which are critical components in high-performance QKD systems. However, its vulnerability to blinding attacks has been recently reported. In this work, we propose a new countermeasure that prevents this potential security loophole from being used in detector blinding attacks. An experimental QKD setup is implemented and various tests are conducted to verify the feasibility and performance of the proposed method. The obtained measurement results show that the proposed scheme successfully detects occurring blinding-attack-based hacking attempts.
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