On the Content Security Policy Violations due to the Same-Origin Policy
Doli\`ere Francis Som\'e, Nataliia Bielova, Tamara Rezk

TL;DR
This paper investigates how Content Security Policy (CSP) can be violated due to interactions with the Same Origin Policy (SOP), revealing significant vulnerabilities in current browser implementations and proposing measures to prevent such violations.
Contribution
It provides the first large-scale analysis of CSP violations caused by SOP interactions, highlighting implementation discrepancies and suggesting mitigation strategies.
Findings
31.1% of CSP-enabled pages are potentially vulnerable to violations
23.5% of pages can experience CSP violations in nested browsing contexts
Identified divergence in browser enforcement of CSP in srcdoc sandboxed iframes
Abstract
Modern browsers implement different security policies such as the Content Security Policy (CSP), a mechanism designed to mitigate popular web vulnerabilities, and the Same Origin Policy (SOP), a mechanism that governs interactions between resources of web pages. In this work, we describe how CSP may be violated due to the SOP when a page contains an embedded iframe from the same origin. We analyse 1 million pages from 10,000 top Alexa sites and report that at least 31.1% of current CSP-enabled pages are potentially vulnerable to CSP violations. Further considering real-world situations where those pages are involved in same-origin nested browsing contexts, we found that in at least 23.5% of the cases, CSP violations are possible. During our study, we also identified a divergence among browsers implementations in the enforcement of CSP in srcdoc sandboxed iframes, which actually reveals…
Peer Reviews
No public reviews on file for this paper yet. If you reviewed it on a platform where reviews are public (OpenReview, ICLR, NeurIPS, ICML), you can paste yours below so the community can read it here.
Videos
No videos yet. Explain this paper in a talk, walkthrough, or lecture? Add one.
