Lightweight Interactions for Reciprocal Cooperation in a Social Network Game

TL;DR

This paper demonstrates that lightweight, low-cost interactions can foster reciprocal cooperation in social networks, revealing mechanisms for reliable signaling despite theoretical doubts about low-cost signals.

Contribution

It introduces the concept that low-cost, non-risky interactions can effectively build reciprocal relationships in social network games, highlighting a potential evolutionary mechanism.

Findings

People increase cooperation through lightweight interactions

Low-cost signals can be reliable in social contexts

Reciprocal relationships can be built without high-cost signaling

Abstract

The construction of reciprocal relationships requires cooperative interactions during the initial meetings. However, cooperative behavior with strangers is risky because the strangers may be exploiters. In this study, we show that people increase the likelihood of cooperativeness of strangers by using lightweight non-risky interactions in risky situations based on the analysis of a social network game (SNG). They can construct reciprocal relationships in this manner. The interactions involve low-cost signaling because they are not generated at any cost to the senders and recipients. Theoretical studies show that low-cost signals are not guaranteed to be reliable because the low-cost signals from senders can lie at any time. However, people used low-cost signals to construct reciprocal relationships in an SNG, which suggests the existence of mechanisms for generating reliable, low-cost signals in human evolution.