Model Uncertainty Stochastic Mean-Field Control
Nacira Agram, Bernt {\O}ksendal

TL;DR
This paper develops a novel stochastic control framework for mean-field SDEs under model uncertainty, formulating it as a differential game with measure-valued controls and deriving maximum principles for Nash equilibria and saddle points.
Contribution
It introduces a new class of stochastic control problems involving measure-valued controls and provides maximum principles for Nash and saddle point solutions.
Findings
Derived a sufficient maximum principle for nonzero-sum games.
Established saddle point conditions for zero-sum games.
Provided an explicit solution for an optimal consumption problem under model uncertainty.
Abstract
We consider the problem of optimal control of a mean-field stochastic differential equation under model uncertainty. The model uncertainty is represented by ambiguity about the law of the state at time . For example, it could be the law of with respect to the given, underlying probability measure . This is the classical case when there is no model uncertainty. But it could also be the law with respect to some other probability measure or, more generally, any random measure on with total mass . We represent this model uncertainty control problem as a stochastic differential game of a mean-field related type stochastic differential equation (SDE) with two players. The control of one of the players, representing the uncertainty of the…
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