Normative properties of multi-criteria choice procedures and their superpositions: I

TL;DR

This paper analyzes various multi-criteria choice procedures, examining how they respond to preference changes and identifying which normative properties they satisfy, such as rationality and monotonicity.

Contribution

It provides a theorem characterizing the normative properties satisfied by different multi-criteria choice procedures.

Findings

Certain choice procedures satisfy rationality and monotonicity

The study clarifies how preferences influence choice outcomes

Theoretical framework for evaluating choice procedure properties

Abstract

We consider different choice procedures such as scoring rules, rules, using majority relation, value function and tournament matrix, which are used in social and multi-criteria choice problems. We focus on the study of the properties that show how the final choice is changed due to changes of preferences or a set of feasible alternatives. As a result a theorem is provided showing which normative properties (rationality, monotonicity, non-compensability) are satisfied for the given choice procedures.