Interference-Constrained Pricing for D2D Networks
Yuan Liu, Rui Wang, and Zhu Han

TL;DR
This paper introduces a pricing framework for interference management in D2D underlay cellular networks, using game theory to optimize base station revenue while controlling interference, with algorithms suitable for various network information scenarios.
Contribution
It develops a novel game-theoretic pricing framework for interference management in D2D networks, including distributed algorithms for different levels of network information.
Findings
Distributed algorithms effectively manage interference.
Pricing strategies improve system utility and revenue.
Framework adaptable to various network information conditions.
Abstract
The concept of device-to-device (D2D) communications underlaying cellular networks opens up potential benefits for improving system performance but also brings new challenges such as interference management. In this paper, we propose a pricing framework for interference management from the D2D users to the cellular system, where the base station (BS) protects itself (or its serving cellular users) by pricing the crosstier interference caused from the D2D users. A Stackelberg game is formulated to model the interactions between the BS and D2D users. Specifically, the BS sets prices to a maximize its revenue (or any desired utility) subject to an interference temperature constraint. For given prices, the D2D users competitively adapt their power allocation strategies for individual utility maximization. We first analyze the competition among the D2D users by noncooperative game theory and…
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Taxonomy
TopicsAdvanced MIMO Systems Optimization · ICT Impact and Policies · Advanced Wireless Network Optimization
