An arbiter PUF secured by remote random reconfigurations of an FPGA
Alexander Spenke, Ralph Breithaupt, and Rainer Plaga

TL;DR
This paper introduces a novel FPGA-based PUF authentication method that uses remote reconfiguration to enhance security, making it resistant to machine learning attacks and difficult to clone or measure.
Contribution
It proposes a new secure PUF implementation on FPGA that employs remote reconfiguration to prevent attackers from gaining useful information, advancing physical unclonable function technology.
Findings
Successfully reconfigured ten 64-stage PUFs in 25 seconds
Generated a fingerprint from each PUF within 1 millisecond
Demonstrated immunity to known machine learning attacks
Abstract
We present a practical and highly secure method for the authentication of chips based on a new concept for implementing strong Physical Unclonable Function (PUF) on field programmable gate arrays (FPGA). Its qualitatively novel feature is a remote reconfiguration in which the delay stages of the PUF are arranged to a random pattern within a subset of the FPGA's gates. Before the reconfiguration is performed during authentication the PUF simply does not exist. Hence even if an attacker has the chip under control previously she can gain no useful information about the PUF. This feature, together with a strict renunciation of any error correction and challenge selection criteria that depend on individual properties of the PUF that goes into the field make our strong PUF construction immune to all machine learning attacks presented in the literature. More sophisticated attacks on our…
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