Joint Resource Bidding and Tipping Strategies in Multi-hop Cognitive Networks

TL;DR

This paper introduces a joint resource bidding and tipping framework for multi-hop cognitive networks, optimizing auction mechanisms to enhance revenue, fairness, and social welfare while satisfying key economic properties.

Contribution

It develops a novel auction framework with a bidding language and group partitioning schemes that improve resource allocation and revenue in multi-hop secondary networks.

Findings

Static group scheme increases winners by 150% and triples PO revenue for high-demand users.

Dynamic scheme maintains revenue while reducing prices for low-demand users.

Proposed mechanisms satisfy truthfulness, individual rationality, and computational efficiency.

Abstract

In multi-hop secondary networks, bidding strategies for spectrum auction, route selection and relaying incentives should be jointly considered to establish multi-hop communication. In this paper, a framework for joint resource bidding and tipping is developed where users iteratively revise their strategies, which include bidding and incentivizing relays, to achieve their Quality of Service (QoS) requirements. A bidding language is designed to generalize secondary users' heterogeneous demands for multiple resources and willingness to pay. Then, group partitioning-based auction mechanisms are presented to exploit the heterogeneity of SU demands in multi-hop secondary networks. These mechanisms include primary operator (PO) strategies based on static and dynamic partition schemes combined with new payment mechanisms to obtain high revenue and fairly allocate the resources. The proposed auction schemes stimulate the participation of SUs and provide high revenue for the PO while maximizing the social welfare. Besides, they satisfy the properties of truthfulness, individual rationality and computational tractability. Simulation results have shown that for highly demanding users the static group scheme achieves 150% more winners and 3 times higher revenue for the PO compared to a scheme without grouping. For lowly demanding users, the PO may keep similar revenue with the dynamic scheme by lowering 50% the price per channel as the number of winners will increase proportionally.