Game of Power Allocation on Networks
Yuke Li, A. S Morse

TL;DR
This paper introduces a distributed game model to analyze how countries allocate power in a networked environment, formalizing their behaviors and proving the existence of equilibrium strategies.
Contribution
It formalizes countries' power allocation behaviors and establishes the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibrium in this new game model.
Findings
Formalization of countries' power allocation behaviors
Proof of pure strategy Nash equilibrium existence
Introduction of a new technical problem in networked resource allocation
Abstract
This paper develops a distributed resource allocation game to study countries' pursuit of targets such as self-survival in the networked international environment. The contributions are two. First, the game formalizes countries' power allocation behaviors which fall into the broad category of humans resource allocation behaviors. Second, the game presents a new technical problem, and establishes pure strategy Nash equilibrium existence.
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Taxonomy
TopicsGame Theory and Applications · Opinion Dynamics and Social Influence · Complex Network Analysis Techniques
