Models of Level-0 Behavior for Predicting Human Behavior in Games
James R. Wright, Kevin Leyton-Brown

TL;DR
This paper develops and evaluates new models of level-0 behavior in behavioral game theory, significantly improving predictions of human strategic actions by moving beyond uniform random assumptions.
Contribution
It introduces a systematic approach to modeling level-0 behavior using game features and Bayesian optimization, outperforming traditional uniform models.
Findings
New level-0 model improves predictive accuracy
Combining the model with iterative strategies enhances predictions
Model uses only general features from any normal form game
Abstract
Behavioral game theory seeks to describe the way actual people (as compared to idealized, "rational" agents) act in strategic situations. Our own recent work has identified iterative models (such as quantal cognitive hierarchy) as the state of the art for predicting human play in unrepeated, simultaneous-move games (Wright & Leyton-Brown 2012, 2016). Iterative models predict that agents reason iteratively about their opponents, building up from a specification of nonstrategic behavior called level-0. The modeler is in principle free to choose any description of level-0 behavior that makes sense for the setting. However, almost all existing work specifies this behavior as a uniform distribution over actions. In most games it is not plausible that even nonstrategic agents would choose an action uniformly at random, nor that other agents would expect them to do so. A more accurate model…
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Taxonomy
TopicsSports Analytics and Performance · Artificial Intelligence in Games · Evolutionary Algorithms and Applications
