Public Goods Games on Adaptive Coevolutionary Networks

TL;DR

This paper investigates how cooperation can emerge and persist in public goods games played on adaptive networks where players change strategies and connections without full information, revealing dynamics that promote cooperation.

Contribution

It introduces a coevolutionary model of public goods games on adaptive networks, demonstrating the emergence of cooperation without complete information.

Findings

Cooperation can arise and persist despite fluctuations.

Players adapt strategies and connections to increase payoffs.

Cooperation persists even with limited information.

Abstract

Productive societies feature high levels of cooperation and strong connections between individuals. Public Goods Games (PGGs) are frequently used to study the development of social connections and cooperative behavior in model societies. In such games, contributions to the public good are made only by cooperators, while all players, including defectors, can reap public goods benefits. Classic results of game theory show that mutual defection, as opposed to cooperation, is the Nash Equilibrium of PGGs in well-mixed populations, where each player interacts with all others. In this paper, we explore the coevolutionary dynamics of a low information public goods game on a network without spatial constraints in which players adapt to their environment in order to increase individual payoffs. Players adapt by changing their strategies, either to cooperate or to defect, and by altering their social connections. We find that even if players do not know other players' strategies and connectivity, cooperation can arise and persist despite large short-term fluctuations.