The Maximin Support Method: An Extension of the D'Hondt Method to Approval-Based Multiwinner Elections
Luis S\'anchez-Fern\'andez, Norberto Fern\'andez, Jes\'us A. Fisteus,, Markus Brill
TL;DR
The paper introduces the maximin support method, extending the D'Hondt apportionment to approval-based multiwinner elections, ensuring proportionality and efficiency while maximizing support for the least supported candidate.
Contribution
It presents a novel extension of the D'Hondt method for approval voting, with efficient computation and desirable proportionality properties.
Findings
Supports proportional representation in approval elections
Ensures house and population monotonicity
Related to Phragmén's voting rules
Abstract
We propose the maximin support method, a novel extension of the D'Hondt apportionment method to approval-based multiwinner elections. The maximin support method is based on maximizing the support of the least supported elected candidate. It can be computed efficiently and satisfies (adjusted versions of) the main properties of the original D'Hondt method: house monotonicity, population monotonicity, and proportional representation. We also establish a close relationship between the maximin support method and Phragm\'{e}n's voting rules.
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Taxonomy
TopicsGame Theory and Voting Systems · Internet Traffic Analysis and Secure E-voting · Electoral Systems and Political Participation