Secure Multicast Communications with Private Jammers
Kanapathippillai Cumanan, Zhiguo Ding, Mai Xu, and H. Vincent Poor

TL;DR
This paper explores optimizing secrecy rates in multicast networks using private jammers, modeling the interactions as a Stackelberg game to maximize revenue and improve security against eavesdroppers.
Contribution
It introduces a game-theoretic framework for secrecy rate optimization with private jammers, deriving closed-form solutions and equilibrium strategies for revenue maximization.
Findings
Closed-form solution for optimal interference generation
Derivation of Stackelberg equilibrium for revenue maximization
Simulation validation of theoretical results
Abstract
This paper investigates secrecy rate optimization for a multicasting network, in which a transmitter broadcasts the same information to multiple legitimate users in the presence of multiple eavesdroppers. In order to improve the achievable secrecy rates, private jammers are employed to generate interference to confuse the eavesdroppers. These private jammers charge the legitimate transmitter for their jamming services based on the amount of interference received at the eavesdroppers. Therefore, this secrecy rate maximization problem is formulated as a Stackelberg game, in which the private jammers and the transmitter are the leaders and the follower of the game, respectively. A fixed interference price scenario is considered first, in which a closed-form solution is derived for the optimal amount of interference generated by the jammers to maximize the revenue of the legitimate…
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Taxonomy
TopicsWireless Communication Security Techniques · Cooperative Communication and Network Coding · Security in Wireless Sensor Networks
