Secure Multicast Communications with Private Jammers

TL;DR

This paper explores optimizing secrecy rates in multicast networks using private jammers, modeling the interactions as a Stackelberg game to maximize revenue and improve security against eavesdroppers.

Contribution

It introduces a game-theoretic framework for secrecy rate optimization with private jammers, deriving closed-form solutions and equilibrium strategies for revenue maximization.

Findings

Closed-form solution for optimal interference generation

Derivation of Stackelberg equilibrium for revenue maximization

Simulation validation of theoretical results

Abstract

This paper investigates secrecy rate optimization for a multicasting network, in which a transmitter broadcasts the same information to multiple legitimate users in the presence of multiple eavesdroppers. In order to improve the achievable secrecy rates, private jammers are employed to generate interference to confuse the eavesdroppers. These private jammers charge the legitimate transmitter for their jamming services based on the amount of interference received at the eavesdroppers. Therefore, this secrecy rate maximization problem is formulated as a Stackelberg game, in which the private jammers and the transmitter are the leaders and the follower of the game, respectively. A fixed interference price scenario is considered first, in which a closed-form solution is derived for the optimal amount of interference generated by the jammers to maximize the revenue of the legitimate transmitter. Based on this solution, the Stackelberg equilibrium of the proposed game, at which both legitimate transmitter and the private jammers achieve their maximum revenues, is then derived. Simulation results are also provided to validate these theoretical derivations.