Random Tie-breaking with Stochastic Dominance
Reshef Meir
TL;DR
This paper characterizes voter better-replies under stochastic dominance in plurality voting with random tie-breaking, using axiomatic preference extensions over sets to analyze strategic behavior.
Contribution
It introduces a comprehensive axiomatic framework to characterize all better-replies of voters in plurality voting with stochastic dominance tie-breaking.
Findings
All better-replies can be characterized using axiomatic extensions of preferences.
Provides a formal method to analyze strategic voting behavior under stochastic dominance.
Enhances understanding of voter incentives in randomized tie-breaking scenarios.
Abstract
Consider Plurality with random tie-breaking. This paper uses standard axiomatic extensions of preferences over elements to preferences over sets (Kelly, Gardenfors, Responsiveness) to characterize all better-replies of a voter under stochastic dominance.
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Taxonomy
TopicsGame Theory and Voting Systems · Complexity and Algorithms in Graphs · Optimization and Search Problems