Cryptographic Enforcement of Information Flow Policies without Public Information via Tree Partitions
Jason Crampton, Naomi Farley, Gregory Gutin, Mark Jones, Bertram, Poettering

TL;DR
This paper introduces tree partitions for cryptographic enforcement of information flow policies, enabling schemes without public information and optimizing secret distribution.
Contribution
It defines tree partitions as a generalization of chain partitions and develops algorithms to optimize secret distribution in cryptographic enforcement schemes.
Findings
Tree partitions generalize chain partitions for policy enforcement.
Schemes based on tree partitions preserve strong security properties.
Algorithms efficiently minimize secret material distribution.
Abstract
We may enforce an information flow policy by encrypting a protected resource and ensuring that only users authorized by the policy are able to decrypt the resource. In most schemes in the literature that use symmetric cryptographic primitives, each user is assigned a single secret and derives decryption keys using this secret and publicly available information. Recent work has challenged this approach by developing schemes, based on a chain partition of the information flow policy, that do not require public information for key derivation, the trade-off being that a user may need to be assigned more than one secret. In general, many different chain partitions exist for the same policy and, until now, it was not known how to compute an appropriate one. In this paper, we introduce the notion of a tree partition, of which chain partitions are a special case. We show how a tree partition…
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