Breaching the Privacy of Israel's Paper Ballot Voting System
Tomer Ashur, Orr Dunkelman, Nimrod Talmon

TL;DR
This paper exposes vulnerabilities in Israel's paper ballot voting system, demonstrating an algorithm that can recover voters' choices with high accuracy, thereby challenging the system's privacy guarantees.
Contribution
The authors present a novel algorithm that breaches voter privacy in Israel's paper ballot system using publicly available data, highlighting security weaknesses.
Findings
Algorithm correctly recovers up to 96% of votes
Simulations based on real Israeli data validate the approach
Vulnerabilities pose risks to election privacy and integrity
Abstract
An election is a process through which citizens in liberal democracies select their governing bodies, usually through voting. For elections to be truly honest, people must be able to vote freely without being subject to coercion; that is why voting is usually done in a private manner. In this paper we analyze the security offered by a paper-ballot voting system that is used in Israel, as well as in several other countries around the world. we provide an algorithm which, based on publicly available information, breaks the privacy of the voters participating in such elections. Simulations based on real data collected in Israel show that our algorithm performs well, and can correctly recover the vote of up to 96% of the voters.
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Taxonomy
TopicsInternet Traffic Analysis and Secure E-voting · Law, Rights, and Freedoms
