On Strategic Multi-Antenna Jamming in Centralized Detection Networks

TL;DR

This paper models a game between a centralized detection network and a multi-antenna jammer, revealing that pure strategies at equilibrium do not affect error probability, but mixed strategies can influence the jammer's utility.

Contribution

It introduces a complete-information game model for multi-antenna jamming in detection networks and analyzes equilibrium strategies and their impact.

Findings

Pure strategy equilibrium does not affect error probability.

Mixed strategies can impact the jammer's expected utility.

The game-theoretic analysis provides insights into strategic jamming behavior.

Abstract

In this paper, we model a complete-information zero-sum game between a centralized detection network with a multiple access channel (MAC) between the sensors and the fusion center (FC), and a jammer with multiple transmitting antennas. We choose error probability at the FC as the performance metric, and investigate pure strategy equilibria for this game, and show that the jammer has no impact on the FC's error probability by employing pure strategies at the Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, we also show that the jammer has an impact on the expected utility if it employs mixed strategies.