On Credit-based Incentive Mechanisms of Voluntary User Comment Reviewing in Social Networks

TL;DR

This paper critically examines credit-based incentive mechanisms for voluntary comment reviewing in social networks, arguing that diminishing returns discourage honest user participation and may undermine the effectiveness of such systems.

Contribution

It provides a theoretical analysis showing the limitations of current credit-based incentives and highlights potential issues with long-term user engagement in comment moderation.

Findings

Credit incentives may fail due to diminishing returns.

Rational users are discouraged from participating in long-term.

Current mechanisms might not sustain honest comment reviewing.

Abstract

With the recent advance of micro-blogs and social networks, people can view and post comments on the websites in a very convenient way. However, it is also a big concern that the malicious users keep polluting the cyber environment by scamming, spamming or repeatedly advertising. So far the most common way to detect and report malicious comments is based on voluntary reviewing from honest users. To encourage contribution, very often some non-monetary credits will be given to an honest user who validly reports a malicious comment. In this note we argue that such credit-based incentive mechanisms should fail in most cases: if reporting a malicious comment receives diminishing revenue, then in the long term no rational honest user will participate in comment reviewing.