Information Security as Strategic (In)effectivity

TL;DR

This paper redefines information security as a means to prevent harm rather than an absolute goal, proposing a harm-based comparison of information flows to assess security effectiveness.

Contribution

It introduces a harm-based framework for evaluating information flow security, contrasting it with classical noninterference, and formalizes how to compare adversarial capabilities.

Findings

Information flow security can be measured by harm potential.

A system is secure if it does not enable more harm than an idealized version.

The harm-based approach aligns security assessment with practical attacker impacts.

Abstract

Security of information flow is commonly understood as preventing any information leakage, regardless of how grave or harmless consequences the leakage can have. In this work, we suggest that information security is not a goal in itself, but rather a means of preventing potential attackers from compromising the correct behavior of the system. To formalize this, we first show how two information flows can be compared by looking at the adversary's ability to harm the system. Then, we propose that the information flow in a system is effectively information-secure if it does not allow for more harm than its idealized variant based on the classical notion of noninterference.