Personal Information Leakage During Password Recovery of Internet Services
Mordechai Guri, Eyal Shemer, Dov Shirtz, Yuval Elovici

TL;DR
This paper investigates how the password recovery processes of major internet services can inadvertently leak personal user information, potentially enabling attackers to gather sensitive data.
Contribution
It reveals vulnerabilities in common password recovery mechanisms that can lead to personal information leakage, highlighting privacy risks.
Findings
Password recovery processes can reveal email addresses and phone numbers.
Attackers can infer additional user details from leaked information.
Different scenarios show varying levels of information exposure.
Abstract
In this paper we examine the standard password recovery process of large Internet services such as Gmail, Facebook, and Twitter. Although most of these services try to maintain user privacy, with regard to registration information and other personal information provided by the user, we demonstrate that personal information can still be obtained by unauthorized individuals or attackers. This information includes the full (or partial) email address, phone number, friends list, address, etc. We examine different scenarios and demonstrate how the details revealed in the password recovery process can be used to deduct more focused information about users.
Peer Reviews
No public reviews on file for this paper yet. If you reviewed it on a platform where reviews are public (OpenReview, ICLR, NeurIPS, ICML), you can paste yours below so the community can read it here.
Videos
No videos yet. Explain this paper in a talk, walkthrough, or lecture? Add one.
