Self-organization in a distributed coordination game through heuristic rules
S. Agarwal, D. Ghosh, A. S. Chakrabarti

TL;DR
This paper explores how a large group of agents can self-organize to select a single equilibrium in a distributed coordination game using heuristic reinforcement learning rules, balancing speed and stability.
Contribution
It introduces heuristic rules based on reinforcement learning for equilibrium selection in a multi-agent coordination game, analyzing their effects on self-organization and stability.
Findings
Agents form clusters with different intensities based on heuristics
Most clusters are transient except one, indicating a dominant equilibrium
There is a trade-off between convergence speed and solution stability
Abstract
In this paper we consider a distributed coordination game played by a large number of agents with finite information sets, which characterizes emergence of a single dominant attribute out of a large number of competitors. Formally, agents play a coordination game repeatedly which has exactly Nash equilibria and all of the equilibria are equally preferred by the agents. The problem is to select one equilibrium out of possible equilibria in the least number of attempts. We propose a number of heuristic rules based on reinforcement learning to solve the coordination problem. We see that the agents self-organize into clusters with varying intensities depending on the heuristic rule applied although all clusters but one are transitory in most cases. Finally, we characterize a trade-off in terms of the time requirement to achieve a degree of stability in strategies and the…
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Taxonomy
TopicsGame Theory and Applications · Economic theories and models · Auction Theory and Applications
