Differentiating Infinite Voting Populations using Ultrafilters
Priyanka Menon
TL;DR
This paper explores the mathematical structure of voting systems with infinitely many voters, using ultrafilters and the Rudin-Frolik order to understand the nature of invisible dictatorships in social choice theory.
Contribution
It introduces a novel application of ultrafilters and the Rudin-Frolik order to analyze infinite voter populations in social welfare functions.
Findings
Characterizes the structure of invisible dictatorships in infinite voter settings
Uses ultrafilters to distinguish different types of social welfare functions
Provides insights into the nature of decision-making in infinite populations
Abstract
In this short paper, we use the Rudin-Frolik order to shed light on the differing structures of invisible dictatorships given by Arrow-type social welfare functions over a countably infinite number of voters.
Peer Reviews
No public reviews on file for this paper yet. If you reviewed it on a platform where reviews are public (OpenReview, ICLR, NeurIPS, ICML), you can paste yours below so the community can read it here.
Videos
No videos yet. Explain this paper in a talk, walkthrough, or lecture? Add one.
Taxonomy
TopicsGame Theory and Voting Systems · Economic theories and models · Game Theory and Applications