Locality-based Network Creation Games
Davide Bil\`o, Luciano Gual\`a, Stefano Leucci, Guido Proietti

TL;DR
This paper investigates network creation games where players have limited local knowledge, analyzing the impact on equilibria and efficiency, and providing bounds on the price of anarchy across different knowledge radii.
Contribution
It introduces a new local-knowledge model for network creation games and derives bounds on the price of anarchy for various game variants and knowledge levels.
Findings
Bounds on the price of anarchy for different local knowledge radii.
Analysis of equilibrium properties under limited information.
Experimental validation of theoretical bounds.
Abstract
Network creation games have been extensively studied, both from economists and computer scientists, due to their versatility in modeling individual-based community formation processes, which in turn are the theoretical counterpart of several economics, social, and computational applications on the Internet. In their several variants, these games model the tension of a player between her two antagonistic goals: to be as close as possible to the other players, and to activate a cheapest possible set of links. However, the generally adopted assumption is that players have a \emph{common and complete} information about the ongoing network, which is quite unrealistic in practice. In this paper, we consider a more compelling scenario in which players have only limited information about the network they are embedded in. More precisely, we explore the game-theoretic and computational…
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