False confidence, non-additive beliefs, and valid statistical inference
Ryan Martin

TL;DR
The paper argues that traditional probability-based inference can lead to false confidence and proposes a framework using non-additive beliefs, such as belief functions and random sets, to achieve valid statistical inference and avoid systematic bias.
Contribution
It introduces a novel framework based on non-additive beliefs and validity conditions that ensures reliable inference and avoids false confidence, addressing fundamental issues in statistical theory.
Findings
Traditional probability frameworks suffer from false confidence.
Non-additive beliefs can provide valid, calibrated inference.
Classical procedures like p-values align with the proposed framework.
Abstract
Statistics has made tremendous advances since the times of Fisher, Neyman, Jeffreys, and others, but the fundamental and practically relevant questions about probability and inference that puzzled our founding fathers remain unanswered. To bridge this gap, I propose to look beyond the two dominating schools of thought and ask the following three questions: what do scientists need out of statistics, do the existing frameworks meet these needs, and, if not, how to fill the void? To the first question, I contend that scientists seek to convert their data, posited statistical model, etc., into calibrated degrees of belief about quantities of interest. To the second question, I argue that any framework that returns additive beliefs, i.e., probabilities, necessarily suffers from {\em false confidence}---certain false hypotheses tend to be assigned high probability---and, therefore, risks…
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