On Selfish Creation of Robust Networks

TL;DR

This paper introduces a model for selfish network creation where agents aim for centrality and robustness, explaining how naturally grown networks like the Internet can be both robust and efficient despite decentralized control.

Contribution

It presents the first simple model for selfish network creation that incorporates robustness and centrality, analyzing its properties, computational complexity, and game dynamics.

Findings

Networks are diverse and robust despite selfish creation.

The model adapts techniques from non-robust network theories.

Bounds on the Price of Anarchy are established.

Abstract

Robustness is one of the key properties of nowadays networks. However, robustness cannot be simply enforced by design or regulation since many important networks, most prominently the Internet, are not created and controlled by a central authority. Instead, Internet-like networks emerge from strategic decisions of many selfish agents. Interestingly, although lacking a coordinating authority, such naturally grown networks are surprisingly robust while at the same time having desirable properties like a small diameter. To investigate this phenomenon we present the first simple model for selfish network creation which explicitly incorporates agents striving for a central position in the network while at the same time protecting themselves against random edge-failure. We show that networks in our model are diverse and we prove the versatility of our model by adapting various properties and techniques from the non-robust versions which we then use for establishing bounds on the Price of Anarchy. Moreover, we analyze the computational hardness of finding best possible strategies and investigate the game dynamics of our model.