Detecting Algebraic Manipulation in Leaky Storage Systems

TL;DR

This paper introduces a-AMD codes that secure against algebraic manipulation even when storage leaks partial information, providing bounds, constructions, and applications in secret sharing and wiretap channels.

Contribution

It proposes a-AMD codes for leakage scenarios, deriving bounds, constructions, and demonstrating their application in secure communication schemes.

Findings

Rate upper bound of 1-a for strong a-AMD codes

Existence of a^{LV}-AMD codes achieving rate 1-a asymptotically

Applications to secret sharing and wiretap channels with leakage and tampering

Abstract

Algebraic Manipulation Detection (AMD) Codes detect adversarial noise that is added to a coded message and stored in a storage that is opaque to the adversary. We study AMD codes when the storage can leak up to \rho\log|G| bits of information about the stored codeword, where G is the group in which the stored codeword lives and \rho is a constant. We propose \rho-AMD codes that provide protection in this new setting, and define weak and strong \rho-AMD codes that provide security for a random and an arbitrary message, respectively. We derive concrete and asymptotic bounds for the efficiency of these codes featuring a rate upper bound of 1-\rho for the strong codes. We also define the class of \rho^{LV}-AMD codes that provide protection when leakage is in the form of a number of codeword components, and give constructions featuring a strong \rho^{LV}-AMD codes that asymptotically achieve the rate 1-\rho. We describe applications of \rho-AMD codes to, (i) robust ramp secret sharing scheme and, (ii) wiretap II channel when the adversary can eavesdrop a \rho fraction of codeword components and tamper with all components of the codeword.