Bayesian Games with Intentions
Adam Bjorndahl (CMU), Joseph Y. Halpern (Cornell University), Rafael, Pass (Cornell University)

TL;DR
This paper introduces Bayesian games with intentions, a new framework that extends traditional Bayesian and psychological games by distinguishing between intended and actual strategies, enabling richer modeling of belief-dependent preferences.
Contribution
It generalizes Bayesian and psychological games by incorporating intentions, and proves the correspondence of psychological game equilibria within this new framework.
Findings
Bayesian games with intentions can represent a broader class of belief-dependent preferences.
Nash equilibria in psychological games are a special case of equilibria in the proposed framework.
The framework bridges the gap between Bayesian and psychological game models.
Abstract
We show that standard Bayesian games cannot represent the full spectrum of belief-dependent preferences. However, by introducing a fundamental distinction between intended and actual strategies, we remove this limitation. We define Bayesian games with intentions, generalizing both Bayesian games and psychological games, and prove that Nash equilibria in psychological games correspond to a special class of equilibria as defined in our setting.
Peer Reviews
No public reviews on file for this paper yet. If you reviewed it on a platform where reviews are public (OpenReview, ICLR, NeurIPS, ICML), you can paste yours below so the community can read it here.
Videos
No videos yet. Explain this paper in a talk, walkthrough, or lecture? Add one.
Taxonomy
TopicsDecision-Making and Behavioral Economics · Game Theory and Applications
