Enhancing Accountability and Trust in Distributed Ledgers
Maurice Herlihy, Mark Moir

TL;DR
This paper discusses how permissioned decentralized ledgers can improve accountability and fairness by implementing mechanisms to detect and penalize manipulation, enhancing trust in distributed ledger systems.
Contribution
It proposes design principles and mechanisms to prevent and detect manipulation in permissioned ledgers, addressing a gap in existing accountability measures.
Findings
Proposes new mechanisms for detecting violations
Suggests design principles for fairness enforcement
Highlights the potential for increased trust in permissioned ledgers
Abstract
Permisionless decentralized ledgers ("blockchains") such as the one underlying the cryptocurrency Bitcoin allow anonymous participants to maintain the ledger, while avoiding control or "censorship" by any single entity. In contrast, permissioned decentralized ledgers exploit real-world trust and accountability, allowing only explicitly authorized parties to maintain the ledger. Permissioned ledgers support more flexible governance and a wider choice of consensus mechanisms. Both kinds of decentralized ledgers may be susceptible to manipulation by participants who favor some transactions over others. The real-world accountability underlying permissioned ledgers provides an opportunity to impose fairness constraints that can be enforced by penalizing violators after-the- fact. To date, however, this opportunity has not been fully exploited, unnecessarily leaving participants latitude to…
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Taxonomy
TopicsBlockchain Technology Applications and Security · Cryptography and Data Security · Internet Traffic Analysis and Secure E-voting
