Detecting service provider alliances on the choreography enactment pricing game

TL;DR

This paper introduces a cooperative game-theoretic model for scheduling jobs with competing service providers, and presents a novel algorithm to detect alliances among providers based on their bargaining behavior.

Contribution

It develops the choreography enactment pricing game model and proposes a new algorithm for alliance detection in decentralized service markets.

Findings

The algorithm effectively identifies alliances among service providers.

The model captures strategic behavior in peer-to-peer service compositions.

Alliance detection can influence market competitiveness and pricing strategies.

Abstract

We present the choreography enactment pricing game, a cooperative game-theoretic model for the study of scheduling of jobs using competitor service providers. A choreography (a peer-to-peer service composition model) needs a set of services to fulfill its jobs requirements. Users must choose, for each requirement, which service providers will be used to enact the choreography at lowest cost. Due to the lack of centralization, vendors can form alliances to control the market. We show a novel algorithm capable of detecting alliances among service providers, based on our study of the bargaining set of this game.