Cost Effective Campaigning in Social Networks
Bhushan Kotnis, Joy Kuri

TL;DR
This paper presents a novel approach using percolation theory to optimize incentive allocation in social networks for maximizing outreach or minimizing costs under budget constraints.
Contribution
It introduces a new formulation of campaign optimization problems using percolation theory and demonstrates that these can be solved via simple linear programs for general cost structures.
Findings
Optimization problems can be solved with linear programming.
Percolation theory effectively models influence spread in social networks.
The approach is applicable to various incentive cost structures.
Abstract
Campaigners are increasingly using online social networking platforms for promoting products, ideas and information. A popular method of promoting a product or even an idea is incentivizing individuals to evangelize the idea vigorously by providing them with referral rewards in the form of discounts, cash backs, or social recognition. Due to budget constraints on scarce resources such as money and manpower, it may not be possible to provide incentives for the entire population, and hence incentives need to be allocated judiciously to appropriate individuals for ensuring the highest possible outreach size. We aim to do the same by formulating and solving an optimization problem using percolation theory. In particular, we compute the set of individuals that are provided incentives for minimizing the expected cost while ensuring a given outreach size. We also solve the problem of computing…
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