TL;DR
This paper analyzes international BGP routing detours, revealing their prevalence, duration, and country-specific characteristics, which is crucial for network management, policy, and privacy considerations.
Contribution
It provides the first large-scale characterization of international routing detours, identifying key patterns, causes, and country-specific behaviors using extensive BGP data analysis.
Findings
Over 5,000 prefixes experienced detours during January 2016.
Most detours were transient, lasting less than 72 hours.
A small number of ASes caused most detours.
Abstract
There are currently no requirements (technical or otherwise) that BGP paths must be contained within national boundaries. Indeed, some paths experience international detours, i.e., originate in one country, cross international boundaries and return to the same country. In most cases these are sensible traffic engineering or peering decisions at ISPs that serve multiple countries. In some cases such detours may be suspicious. Characterizing international detours is useful to a number of players: (a) network engineers trying to diagnose persistent problems, (b) policy makers aiming at adhering to certain national communication policies, (c) entrepreneurs looking for opportunities to deploy new networks, or (d) privacy-conscious states trying to minimize the amount of internal communication traversing different jurisdictions. In this paper we characterize international detours in the…
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